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Abstract
From beginning to end, John Dewey’s oeuvre is filled with philosophical discussions 
and political comments on the significance de jure and de facto of a wide range of 
distinct social spaces. In contrast to subjects he addresses regularly and others that he 
focuses on occasionally, his work does not systematically address sport. Nonetheless, 
sport is expressly recognized as a noteworthy environment and integrated into lines 
of argumentation in no small number of areas as an example. This paper provides an 
overview of the statements he made on this subject and their context, organizing them 
on the basis of their social, pedagogical, and aesthetic implications in order to make a 
supplementary contribution to social spaces in his work. It shall be demonstrated that 
Dewey assumes a number of positive possibilities in and through sport, but that these 
are not anchored naturally in or through sport. What sport and movement cultures 
finally are or should be remains pragmatically dependent on the intentions and con-
sequences that serve as the basis for each specific sporting situation.
Introduction
Inherent in the cultural naturalism of John Dewey is a deep connection between 
experience and nature. Experience is the humanly possible interplay with nature, 
“a means of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature” (LW 1, 5). 
Nature is the bedrock of experience, captured in a concept that no longer refers to 
a “block universe” (316)—an essentially given, firmly established order of things, 
beings, and species—but rather “a realm of existence, composed of events” (Kahn 
1948, 316), temporally and spatially situated appearances which can be given a 
meaning, evolving as the realization of natural potentials within the framework 
of evolutionary interplay. Every existence is therefore an event—nature, the exis-
tence of events; event, the characteristic trait of nature (LW 1, 63; cf. MW 4, 3–14).
This has a permanent impact on the positioning of the culturally shaped 
form of human living. The human, for Dewey, is the event within nature that 
unites coincidental and unique properties. Human beings are natural events like 
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any other natural event. They act in one and the same universe, are subject to the 
same mechanisms that all, even nonhuman, events in nature are subject to. At 
the same time, human events are special because they are the most complex and 
intimate events in nature. Distinct natural events may not represent separate kinds 
of being overall, yet they are also not all identical as a result of this, but rather 
exhibit different graduated degrees of an emergent process of change. Since dif-
ferent natural events interrelate in fields of interaction in unique ways, there is 
the possibility, in fragile moments, that qualitative leaps can occur within nature. 
New levels of organization emerge that are not solely due to the sum of their ele-
ments. Lower, less complex and higher, more complex activities and forms are 
combined with each other. Physical, biological, and mental operations continu-
ally emerge without being identical to what they came from: life from inorganic 
natural processes; mind from organic forms of life in the human species (LW 1, 
cf. LW 12, 26–30). 
In general, Dewey distinguishes between three “levels of increasing complex-
ity and intimacy of interaction among natural events” (LW 1, 200). The first level 
is physical, passive, without feeling. The interactions are physical; adhere to physi-
cal and chemical organizational processes that occur inevitably as long as natural 
laws are those that exist at the moment. Readjustments take place; the direction of 
the readjustment is irrelevant. Inorganic events simply do not care whether or not 
they exist in a certain state. The second level is living, active, involving feelings. The 
interactions are psycho-physical, containing needs, demands, or desires for a living 
state. There are still readjustments, but they are immediately possible as focused 
readjustments. Organic events focus their lives unconsciously on surviving. The 
third level is mental, social, and can abstract meaning from feelings. The interac-
tions are framed symbolically and achieve a cultural function through language 
and communication, referring to qualities of situations as profitable. Feelings will 
not simply be felt, but rather spoken, acquiring a shareable, sustainable, ultimately 
(potentially) action-guiding meaning (194–209, cf. LW 3, 41–54; LW 12, 48–65).
The human is a coincidental and special event in nature, according to Dewey. 
As part of this nature, the human is inevitably involved in a contingent process of 
evolutionary change and struggle, and largely at the mercy of this struggle of life if 
he does not overcome himself in the possible options for mankind: acting socially 
and creating culture. It is merely conditioned in the nature of mankind to produce 
jointly, or better, conjointly the beneficial, good and beautiful in order to continue 
living life unharmed. The eventual result of these perpetually unstable interactions 
is societal association: a differentiated canon of self-logical (“eigenlogischen”) social 
spaces, systems, or fields, of therewith associated organizations, institutions, and 
support mechanisms. Whether in a political, judicial, economic, religious, familial, 
scientific, pedagogical, artistic, or sporting context, humans enter into each specific 
social tie with tried and tested intentions, and come together observably in specific 
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social structures. While Dewey examines some of these achievements in some detail 
and repeatedly (especially politics, economy, education), and partly in isolation or 
in segments (e.g., religion and law) in a descriptive or eulogic manner, at no point 
does he address sport on its own. This does not mean that the phenomenon plays 
no role in his oeuvre. Rather, his statements that relate to the meanings of sporting 
practices or movement cultures are simply not systematically worked out, but are 
instead typically illustrative in their purpose and strewn across his collective works. 
From this angle, the article enters the discussion of sport in Dewey’s writings. The 
purpose of the paper is to assemble these scattered pieces for the first time and thus 
to provide a Deweyan outline of sport: a posthumous draft of his self-assembled 
analyses of very different societal structures. The main idea is to produce a rep-
resentative exegesis of the collected works of John Dewey, elaborated to provide a 
general overview of the societal and democratic meaning that he ascribes to sport 
and movement cultures. Imitating the structure of his oeuvre, the paper is divided 
into three general parts: the first segment focuses on text passages that put the topic 
in a societal context, the second part examines the pedagogical elements, and the 
third section broaches the topic of aesthetic integration.
Social Significance
Modern society is characterized by a variety of different areas, according to Dewey: 
“elements of culture which are segregated in our present life” (LW 2, 110; cf. LW 
10, 26). The individual segments are an expression of a societal development, each 
coming with its own unique practice. This is where the initial observation begins. 
For sport, among other social developments, has become a significant evolutionary 
achievement: “Incidentally, I may remark that the spread of sport and games is one 
of the characteristic features of existing social life” (LW 3, 225). 
For Dewey, sport is a sociohistorically developed realm of society, primarily as 
a non-wage-based space-time form, and similar to other voluntarily or chosen free 
forms of shaping time, it is an organized way of compensating for the strain of daily 
life (MW 14, 86–87). Among its principal features are the quantitative significance and 
emotional energy of sport. Sports are, actively participated as well as passively entered, 
in massive devotion, and for an extensive cross-section of the population, an influen-
tial, largely barrier-free leisure time phenomenon. If nothing else, the large number of 
very different participants alone shows a potential for democratic and democratizing 
life that cannot be underestimated. In “Is There Hope for Politics” (1931), Dewey adds 
that it even contributes to, or can complement, seemingly less ordinary segments of 
modern life that traditionally are connected more or directly with democratization:
Politics may appear on the first page and on the editorial page of news-
papers, but the sport pages occupy more space, and the average reader 
turns these pages with an eagerness which contrasts with the languid way 
in which he reads the political news and skips the editorials. (LW 6, 182)
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However, in some essays and individual comments Dewey also describes—in 
varying degrees—the antitheses. In “A Sick World” (1922), Dewey addresses the form, 
extent, and avoidance of negative developments in social life in North America at the 
beginning of the 1920s. The world is sick not only because certain pathological condi-
tions have been diagnosed by qualified physicians, but also because their treatment 
suppresses the symptoms rather than fighting the causes: “Cure is a negative idea; 
health a positive one” (MW 15, 43). This is seen in very frequent social phenomena, 
such as Couéism and its mantra-like, conscious autosuggestion of getting better and 
better every day in every way, where healing conceals the symptoms so one feels better 
quickly, but does not affect the causes, the real treatment of which are even delayed 
by concealment. Besides autosuggestion and different kinds of drugs, Dewey classi-
fied modern sport as one of those unpropitious, distracting amusement mechanisms 
that “owe today a considerable portion of their attraction to the fact that they give a 
temporary relief from consciousness of troubles” (42). The view of sport as a social 
practice for negative diversion is repeated in “Events and Meanings” (1922), intensified 
here as an externally initiated, mental soporific, and independent means of securing 
power, as a modern interpretation of bread and games for and through the economy:
Those in power are after all afraid of ideas, of conversation. They are afraid that 
conversation is more powerful than the power of the events upon which they so 
triumphantly ride. They give out jobs to keep the rest of us busy, and they dis-
pense indulgences, called sport and amusement. And we are afraid of losing our 
jobs or of missing the latest show if we idle to engage in converse. (MW 13, 278)
In Freedom and Culture (1939) Dewey situates the peak of this adverse aspect 
of sport in the rigid control of social space by nondemocratic governmental systems. 
This broad-based essay is an analytical defense of democracy during the totalitar-
ian wildfires that broke out before the Second World War. Besides the fascist and 
Stalinist systems of that time, Dewey’s critical comments also expressly draw atten-
tion to antidemocratic tendencies in American society. In the chapter entitled “The 
Problem of Freedom,” Dewey directs his argumentation at the successful conditions 
for a social-liberal democracy. The effect that social spaces have is anchored in the 
structural orientation of social sub-areas, in the practical organization of associations, 
connections, and groups. Democratizing spaces give rise to democratic consequences, 
and nondemocratizing spaces to nondemocratic consequences. While the ability of 
the economy and science to contribute here appears to be common and feasible in 
considerations of democratization, Dewey points to the largely disregarded benefits 
of entirely apolitical environments, advocating “the arts, the fine arts, as an impor-
tant part of the social conditions that bear upon democratic institutions and personal 
freedom” (LW 13, 69). This defense of the arts is borne out in the totalitarian antith-
esis. A totalitarian organization is largely successful when a totality of the environ-
ment is coupled with the entirety of human approaches: “It must first of all, and most 
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enduringly of all, if it is to be permanent, command the imagination, with all the 
impulses and motives we have been accustomed to call inner” (70). Dewey grounds 
the democratizing punchline, as well as the perfidious totalitarian creativity, in the 
positive or negative instrumentalisation of those areas in which intended diversion, 
emotional participation, unexpected formatting, and limited resistance are combined. 
And sport is expressly included in this group as a means for producing this effect: 
The theatre, the movie and music hall, even the picture gallery, eloquence, 
popular parades, common sports and recreative agencies, have all been 
brought under regulation as part of the propaganda agencies by which dicta-
torship is kept in power without being regarded by the masses as oppressive. 
We are beginning to realize that emotions and imagination are more potent 
in shaping public sentiment and opinion than information and reason. (70)
Pedagogical Possibilities
Dewey views education as a generic concept comprising all processes for acquiring 
knowledge and learning: intended and not intended, direct and indirect, desired 
and undesired, conscious and unconscious. Dewey himself fills this broad definition 
normatively with democratically and philosophically anchored leit-ideas of a general 
human education. The path and goal is a spatially bound process of growth and the 
ability to grow: accretion of experience through the forming and reforming of habits. 
A second consideration is seen here. As shown by the following reflections, Dewey 
embeds sports and games pedagogically, partly as an example and partly as a model.
 In How We Think (1910), the leisure attraction of sport functions as a didacti-
cally relevant example. Overall, the book, as a pragmatic psychology of thinking, 
and developed for training teachers and other education professionals in what is 
didactically appropriate, addresses the pedagogical importance of phased reflex-
ive thinking and shows its professional-theoretical and school-practical relevance. 
Reflexive thinking is posited as graduated control of the natural and spontaneous 
processes of observation, stimulus, and test in practice, the development of which 
in school is posited as a process moving in the direction of controlled competence. 
In the chapter entitled “The Natural Resources of Thought,” Dewey describes the 
learning-theoretical significance of some natural resources that are central for 
mental stimulation in solving an already identified problem. These can assume a 
potentially action-based status and show the need for evaluation in the emergence, 
processing, selection, and evaluation of suggestions, as spontaneous inspiration 
and trains of thought, without logical status and where the ability to contribute in 
a problem-solving process is still uncertain. Thus natural resources are relevant 
from the perspective of learning theory, have didactical relevance, and are funda-
mental in the development of reflexive thinking. In this context, the disparate level 
of the students is noteworthy. Naturally, the transition from impulses to the idea 
is prefigured by an inter-individual degree of curiosity, facility, and orderliness of 
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uncontrolled, random stimulations. Within the context of schooling in particular, 
Dewey therefore warns against interpreting these differences as indispensable sta-
bilities and creating rigid categories of pupils. Instead, he appeals to the mindset, 
task, and didactic craftsmanship of teachers; for example, in facilitating curiosity 
and suggestive ease with school topics by connecting them to relevant, popular, or 
target-group-adequate subject-matters such as sport:
Yet the teacher is not entitled to assume stupidity or even dullness merely 
because of irresponsiveness to school subjects or to a lesson as presented 
by text-book or teacher. The pupil labeled hopeless may react in quick and 
lively fashion when the thing-in-hand seems to him worthwhile, as some 
out-of-school sport or social affair. Indeed, the school subject might move 
him, were it set in a different context and treated by a different method. A 
boy dull in geometry may prove quick enough when he takes the subject in 
connection with manual training; the girl who seems inaccessible to histori-
cal facts may respond promptly when it is a question of judging the charac-
ter and deeds of people of her acquaintance or of fiction. (MW 6, 209–210)
In Democracy and Education (1916) Dewey addresses the pedagogical signifi-
cance of the dynamic vicissitude of sporting interaction. Fundamentally, the entire 
work is intended for the purpose of not only describing the normative theory of 
growth in itself, but also legitimizing it in an argumentative devaluation of those 
theoretical approaches that have practically influenced the reality of education. In 
the chapter entitled “Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline,” Dewey dis-
cusses the theory of formal discipline critically and assigns to it a procedure that 
aims to cultivate, through repetition, skills determined in advance and considered 
relevant for education. Through mechanical, context-dependent repetition, such 
refinement results in a specialized, very limited, and not universally useful training 
of skills; for example, certain kinds of perception, memory, learning, presentation, 
wanting, feeling, thinking, and doing: “The analogy constantly employed is that of 
a billiard player or gymnast, who by repeated use of certain muscles in a uniform 
way at last secures automatic skill” (MW 9, 66). By contrast, Dewey introduces a 
view of education that posits “selective response” as the goal and mode of exercise, 
an interaction-influenced procedure, from which one can, from the murkiest of 
reactions that are triggered at a certain time, separate out those things “which are 
especially adapted to the utilization of the stimulus” (68– 69). One thing here that is 
very well suited to pedagogy can be found in sport and games; in particular, those 
sporting activities that incorporate constantly changing and varying social acts 
involving human interaction, particularly team games and competitive situations: 
Moreover, the difference between the training of ability to spell which 
comes from taking visual forms in a narrow context and one which takes 
them in connection with the activities required to grasp meaning, such 
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as context, affiliations of descent, etc., may be compared to the difference 
between exercises in the gymnasium with pulley weights to “develop” cer-
tain muscles, and a game or sport. The former is uniform and mechanical; 
it is rigidly specialized. The latter is varied from moment to moment; no 
two acts are quite alike; novel emergencies have to be met; the coordina-
tions forming have to be kept flexible and elastic. Consequently, the train-
ing is much more “general”; that is to say, it covers a wider territory and 
includes more factors. Exactly the same thing holds of special and general 
education of the mind. (71)
Explicit educational value is also ascribed to various structural properties of sport-
ing activity. In Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Dewey regards sport competi-
tion as symbolizing a desirable performance-based organization of the economic 
sub-area of society. The distribution of economic goods—of income, payment, and 
wealth—should not just be carried out randomly but rather according to the spe-
cific performance that can be ascribed to each member of society. Input and output 
should be in due proportion. In an analysis of suitable instincts for the economic 
system, which countered established proposals, Dewey, in the chapter entitled 
“Classification of Instincts,” opposed the possibility of “an acquisitive instinct” and 
proposed instead finding alternatives, among others, “a peculiar sporting instinct,“ 
which, under the assumption of equal starting points and comparable measur-
ability, ties individual performance to economic success and economic success to 
individual performance. In sport, according to Dewey, performance-constituting 
structures are characterized by a special parallelism to the ideals of the perfor-
mance principle. The constitutive dimensions of performance determination and 
evaluation in sport do not simply reflect the principle of performance for sport, but 
rather elevate competitive sport to a moment of performance purity, to a status of 
economic-defining culture:
Not acquiring dollars, but chasing them, hunting them is the important 
thing. Acquisition has its part in the big game, for even the most devoted 
sportsman prefers, other things being equal, to bring home the fox’s brush. 
A tangible result is the mark to one’s self and to others of success in sport. 
(MW 14, 101)
In the chapter entitled “The School and Social Progress” in The School and 
Society (1899), Dewey asks why the American education system is not sufficiently 
able to create a certain type of responsible future citizen. This shortcoming is evident 
in the unsustainable difference between the predominant socializing structures and 
Dewey’s intended objectives of school. With the existing school system it is simply 
not possible to put potential and worthwhile pieces of a democratic education into 
effect. That which is supposed to be, already at this early point in Dewey’s seminal 
considerations, a genuine, conjointly structured practice, and in that correspond to 
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the natural sociability of human ontogenesis, does in fact not appear to do justice 
to the claims, at least not remotely in terms of Dewey’s standards for an adequate 
theory of education. The schooling of students for a non-natural democratic future 
develops in an institutional present that remains in structures that thwart this idea. 
School is not (yet) a natural social unit. As a positive example of the convergence 
of reality and intention, Dewey views structures and organizational processes in 
sport and games as ideal:
The radical reason that the present school cannot organize itself as a natural 
social unit is because just this element of common and productive activ-
ity is absent. Upon the playground, in game and sport, social organization 
takes place spontaneously and inevitably. There is something to do, some 
activity to be carried on, requiring natural divisions of labor, selection of 
leaders and followers, mutual co-operation and emulation. (MW 1, 10)
At this point, however, Dewey does not mention the fact that sport and games do 
not develop through natural law. Rather, they develop culturally, can be negotiated 
socially, and follow by themselves and inevitably a common denominator based on 
incorporated modalities of conduct. Community has its basis in natural sociability, 
but its practical implementation does not automatically follow “in an enduring way 
purely spontaneously” (LW 13, 35); rather, it requires communal processes of nego-
tiation, memory, and demand. In Experience and Education (1938), Dewey com-
bines these views with the question of pedagogically desirable structures of school 
teaching. Starting with “the old question of individual freedom and social control” 
(31), he develops, in the chapter “Social Control,” a basic idea of social control that 
collectively transfers desirable conduct to the future generation, but “is not felt to 
involve restriction of personal freedom” (32). For school, this should entail minimiz-
ing elements of directive influence on behavioral expectations to the greatest extent 
possible, replacing them with the circumstances of daily conduct “that are conducive 
to community activity and to organization which exercises control over individual 
impulses by the mere fact that all are engaged in communal projects” (36). Dewey 
suggests a model of social control that is worthy of transfer, “an example of normal 
social control” (37), in diverse forms of games and types of team sport. Games and 
sport are constituted by rules and restrict the conduct of the participating actors 
by consent, in an accepted, unconscious way, with mutual coordination, and due 
to a shared experience: in order to maintain training, competition, the game situ-
ation, and aesthetic involvement (at least as long as the conduct moves within the 
arranged framework and in conformity with the governed canon):
Children at recess or after school play games, from tag and one-old-cat 
to baseball and football. The games involve rules, and these rules order 
their conduct. The games do not go on haphazardly or by a succession of 
improvisations. Without rules there is no game. If disputes arise there is an 
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umpire to appeal to, or discussion and a kind of arbitration are means to a 
decision; otherwise the game is broken up and comes to an end . . . . There 
are certain fairly obvious controlling features of such situations to which 
I want to call attention. The first is that the rules are a part of the game. 
They are not outside of it. No rules, then no game; different rules, then a 
different game. As long as the game goes on with a reasonable smooth-
ness, the players do not feel that they are submitting to external imposition 
but that they are playing the game. In the second place an individual may 
at times feel that a decision isn’t fair and he may even get angry. But he is 
not objecting to a rule but to what he claims is a violation of it, to some 
one-sided and unfair action. In the third place, the rules, and hence the 
conduct of the game, are fairly standardized. There are recognized ways 
of counting out, of selection of sides, as well as for positions to be taken, 
movements to be made, etc. (32)
In general, Dewey anchors the role of such environments not sociologically, 
but in a naturalistically based psycho-social psychology: as “an attempt to understand 
and explain how the thought, feeling and behavior of individuals are influenced by 
the actual, imagined, or implied presence of others” (Allport 1954, 5). The focus 
is on the individual, personal habits, the person’s mind. The goal of the findings is 
not how individual or collective spirit forms social spaces, but rather how different 
groups and their overtly individual characteristics create different spirits:
The conclusion seems inevitable that since “mind” does not appear in the 
original list of instincts it represents something acquired. It represents a 
reorganization of original activities through their operation in a given 
environment. It is a formation, not a datum; a product, and a cause only 
after it has been produced. (MW 10, 58, cf. MW 14)
Dewey makes impressive use of this model in “Interpretation of the Savage 
Mind” (1902), appropriately in regard to games and sport. The paper addresses the 
question of how the dominant activity of a social group produces generalized mental 
patterns and can influence the entire lifestyle significantly, as well as the course of the 
human species over the long term. In terms of social theory and research method, he 
orients his argument around the demands and conditions of practice: the “mind,” as 
an action-guiding organ, “is at least an organ of service for the control of environment 
in relation to the ends of the life process” (MW 2, 41). Relevant goals are not set by 
pure reason, but rather through the existing tasks in daily life, through that which is 
done and will be done in a group in order to fundamentally shape life. Each analysis 
of social groups finds action-guiding patterns of thought solely in and through the 
analysis of the dominant activity. A person is what he does and, to a certain extent 
and conditioned by socialization processes, what he did for generations: “Occupa-
tions determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control the formation 
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and use of habits” (42, cf. LW 2, 263). Dewey exemplifies this line of argument with 
human development in nomadic hunting, but allows for a generalizing, perpetual 
significance. Characteristic for hunting, as the primary food-obtaining form of life, 
is its immediacy, the direct relationship between needs, activity, and satisfaction of 
needs, of effort and reward: “Want, effort, skill, and satisfaction stand in the closest 
relations to one another. The ultimate aim and the urgent concern of the moment are 
identical” (MW 2, 44). These statements are illustrated ethnographically in an example 
of Australian aborigines who demonstrate the epochal significance of hunting, the 
fact and the way that habits form mental patterns, how those mental patterns define 
the important areas of life, and how those mental patterns, at least partially and in 
new forms, are passed down historically through generations. The life of aborigi-
nes is so fundamentally defined by hunting that not only the act of hunting as such 
prompts mental relevance, but many parts of life can only be interpreted against this 
backdrop. Irrespective of whether it is art, religious ceremonies, funeral rituals, the 
selection of partners, or sexuality, the characteristics of the prevailing activity lead 
to the preference for those possibilities of cultural endowment that offer a familiar 
degree of correspondence. According to Dewey, sport and games in and for moder-
nity preserve the mentally anchored striving for immediacy:
Game and sport are still words which mean the most intense immediate 
play of the emotions, running their entire gamut. And these terms still 
are applied most liberally and most appropriately to hunting. The trans-
ferred application of the hunting language to pursuit of truth, plot inter-
est, business adventure and speculation, to all intense and active forms 
of amusement, to gambling and the “sporting life,” evidences how deeply 
imbedded in later consciousness is the hunting pattern or schema. The 
interest of the game, the alternate suspense and movement, the strained 
and alert attention to stimuli always changing, always demanding grace-
ful, prompt, strategic and forceful response; the play of emotions along the 
scale of want, effort, success or failure—this is the very type, psychically 
speaking, of the drama. (45)
In Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Dewey reinforces the educational 
meaning of the environment with anthropological considerations. The pragmatic 
provisions of the foundations of human nature allow for traceable evidence of the 
feasible paths, means, or directions of development. The evolution of humans thus 
obtains an intrinsic foundation. Fundamental are three central concepts and their 
relationships to each other: habit, impulse, and intelligence. Dewey views mankind 
primarily as “a creature of habit” (MW 14, 88). The human is through and through 
a creature of habit. Being and becoming human can only be understood in the 
decoding of habits, incorporated behavioural dispositions which are acquired with 
relative stability through the unavoidable interaction with an inevitably individual 
living environment. At the same time, even if not synonymously, the human is an 
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organic existence. The human being is not nothing at the beginning of his life and 
becomes something through social integration, but rather possesses inborn impulses 
to react to events in his surroundings. Environments provide meaning for an exist-
ing, energetic endowment. Impulses are the unlearned origin of habits, the undeter-
mined yet determinable material of human nature (63–118; cf. EW 5, 77; MW 9, 67; 
LW 10, 64). Thus the environment matters, be it in a desirable or undesirable way. 
This certainly also applies to athletic environments. Within this context, 
Dewey vividly broaches the issue of the educational possibility of games and sport 
for a morally balanced orientation of impulses in the chapter “No Separate Instincts.” 
Fundamentally, Dewey sees three conceivable consequences of impulses: unintel-
ligent explosion, reorganizing conversion, and imploding forced delay. The delay 
does not obliterate the impulsive force, but rather stores the energy temporarily 
until it can be released at the right opportunity, historically considered primarily 
in largely opposite reactions to the necessary will of a restricting power. Impulses 
perpetuate imbalances and their questionable intolerance in this way. Empirically, 
deprivation has been regularly followed by a lack of restraint, self-righteous times 
by moral permissiveness, romanticism by realism, collectivism by individualism, 
reason by emotion. The conduct adopts in each case converted forms that con-
tinue the imbalance of extreme forms. This applies without exception also to the 
very culture and time in which Dewey maps out these rather abstract conclusions. 
Dewey ascribes to the early 1920s an exploiting economic supremacy in people’s 
lives: exhausting professional demands followed by a search for compensating reac-
tions, for neither monotone nor extremely serious activities “that are significantly 
called re-creation” (MW 14, 111). In both cases the daily imbalance gives rise to 
a distracted Zeitgeist that seeks diversion, replenishment, stimulative compen-
sation; according to Dewey’s diagnosis to artificial stimulus, alcoholic excesses, 
sexual extremes, opium, and other narcotics. The critical aspect, for Dewey, is not 
the pleasure itself, but rather the origin, cause, and consequence. Opportunity is 
successfully sought in the approach, but without the involvement of satisfaction 
in a material sense (110). Symptoms are fought and not the causes; the imbalance 
doubles rather than achieving natural harmony. Based on this contemporary defi-
cit diagnosis, Dewey continuously returns to the practical moral significance of 
games and art: “of sport in its varied forms, drama, fiction, music, poetry, newspa-
pers” (111). The selected cultural spaces succeed in combining compensation with 
meaningfulness, balancing out impulses and achieving compensation. Games and 
art offer, as neither directly useful nor serious but nevertheless sensible activities, 
models for practically useful but, except for the sensation of reward, nonsensible 
mechanical everyday activities; that is, “add[ing] fresh and deeper meanings to the 
usual activities of life” (112). Through the experience of meaningfulness in artistic 
activity, the natural experience of such meaningfulness can be recreated and defined 
as a model for all of life and thus also for professional activity. Through art and 
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games, work is decoupled from meaninglessness. “[A]bnormal artificial exigents 
and stimulations,” such as “useless games and arts,” react to the identical circum-
stance that there is no regulated activity; the impulses and instincts are stimulated 
in full and in an elastically balanced way (112). The clear preference for games and 
art is in the effect of moral depth: the causes of imbalances are fought and not their 
symptoms; process and result achieve a productive, constructive activity and not 
diversion. Art “releases energy in constructive forms” and “is the starting point of 
an activity which shapes material” (113).1
Aesthetic Potential
A third observation is related to considerations on the aesthetic possibility of human 
experience. In his later work Art as Experience (1934), Dewey presents a pragmatic 
theory of art and aesthetics. It might only address sporting practices and movement 
cultures as an aside, but it was predestined for such future application due to its 
broad-based design. The negative starting point of the entire theoretical approach 
is a critique of the spatial exclusivity of aesthetic experience since the 19th century: 
Artworks are now (and in contrast with earlier times) only capitalist, imperialist, 
or nationalist objects of prestige locked away in museums and galleries. Work, daily 
life, pleasure, and joy are treated as separate spheres of human life. By contrast, in the 
first three chapters of Art as Experience, Dewey posits a major role for the aesthetic 
in the past, calling for the recovery of a premodern connection between aesthetic 
consciousness and daily experience. The goal is the condition under which artistic 
works of all complexions elevate the meaning of daily life. This involves eliminat-
ing the separation of everyday and aesthetic experience, reducing it at least to the 
extent that people’s immediate feeling of being in the world becomes constantly 
more fulfilled, that people’s experiences are increasingly free from randomness and 
blind routines. Artworks in a broad sense, including sporting, should be significant 
joists of institutions and practices in daily life: 
The collective life that was manifested in war, worship, the forum, knew no 
division between what was characteristic of these places and operations, 
and the art that brought color, grace, and dignity, into them. Painting and 
sculpture were originally one with architecture, as that was one with the 
social purpose that buildings served. Music and song were intimate parts 
of the rites and ceremonies in which the meaning of group life was con-
summated. Drama was a vital reenactment of the legends and history of 
group life. Not even in Athens can such arts be torn loose from this set-
ting in direct experience and yet retain their significant character. Athletic 
sports, as well as drama, celebrated and enforced traditions of race and 
group, instructing the people commemorating glories, and strengthening 
their civic pride. (LW 10, 13)
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The theoretical foundation of this idea is readily apparent. The inevitable ori-
gin of daily life and art is experience; the requisite “detour” for a pragmatic philoso-
phy of art is the distinction between difference and nondifference in an ordinary and 
aesthetic human understanding of the world. If one takes the assumed continuity 
of natural events seriously, aesthetic experiences are as it were random as well as 
special experiences. Fundamentally, a human is a living being like any other. He 
exists in interaction, is subject to the elementary conditions of life in a contingent 
environment, welcomes orderly circumstances, and encounters these with a feeling 
of harmony if they correspond to his needs. People regularly partake in experiences 
that inherently offer the possibility of an aesthetic impact, but this potential is not 
realized in all, or even most, experiences. Dewey defines the aesthetic difference 
normatively in the uniformity of experiencing. Aesthetic experiences are experi-
ences in which the material and energy of the environment are harmoniously con-
nected with inner impulses at the end of a (necessarily dissonance-initiated) process 
and they expand life qualitatively. Aesthetic experience is the intensified daily life 
experience that assumes a quintessential form as a result of its level of intensity: it 
is completed, consummated, satisfying, well-arranged, assured. Whenever the full 
sense of the ordinary experience is finally expressed it is an aesthetic experience: 
A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its 
solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, 
playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking 
part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consumma-
tion and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it 
its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience. (42)
Dewey views aesthetic experiences as that idealized class of experiences that 
unfurl a holistic potential that is latent in every experience and ultimately combines 
cognitive, emotional, practical, somatic,2 and aesthetic shares in the narrower sense. 
This can take place in and through the artistic media of sport, e.g., a game of ten-
nis (218); however, it does this in Dewey’s conception at most illustratively and in 
praxis as culturally formatted qualities of doing and what is done: 
The act that expresses welcome uses the smile, the outreached hand, the light-
ing up of the face as media, not consciously but because they have become 
organic means of communicating delight upon meeting a valued friend. 
Acts that were primitively spontaneous are converted into means that make 
human intercourse more rich and gracious—just as a painter converts pig-
ment into means of expressing an imaginative experience. Dance and sport 
are activities in which acts once performed spontaneously in separation are 
assembled and converted from raw, crude material into works of expressive 
art. Only where material is employed as media is there expression and art. (69)3
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Conclusion
From beginning to end, Dewey’s oeuvre is filled with philosophical discussions 
and political comments on the significance de jure and de facto of a wide range of 
distinct social spaces. In contrast to subjects he addresses regularly, such as politics, 
economics, and education, or others that he focuses on occasionally, such as religion 
or law, he only makes scattered statements on sporting practice or movement cul-
tures, as examples integrated into overarching lines of argumentation. Nonetheless, 
sport is expressly recognized as a noteworthy environment. This paper provides the 
first overview of the statements made by Dewey on this subject and their context, 
organizing them on the basis of their social, pedagogical, and aesthetic implica-
tions in order to make a supplementary contribution to the examination of social 
spaces in his work. In conclusion, Dewey offers a number of mostly positive pos-
sibilities in and through sport, and ties them together, however pragmatically, not 
substantially, in or through sport at the present time or in the past: Sporting spaces 
are fundamentally responsible for equal opportunity and ultimately a democratic 
and democratizing obligation, like all social spaces, breathing life into socially 
acceptable, pedagogically suitable, or aesthetically graceful interactions, even if 
certain peculiarities of the phenomenon facilitate and complicate such organiza-
tion. What sport can or cannot do remains pragmatically dependent on how each 
specific sporting situation is contextualized. What sport finally is or is not must 
be constantly redefined in a pragmatic way in each specific impact analysis, with 
each specific instrument, and for each specific space and time.
Notes
1.  Cf. acknowledging Cohen (1940, 218); sceptical Paringer (1990, 166), fn. 
141.
2.  Shusterman speaks literally of a somaesthetic in and with Art as Experi-
ence: cf. 2000, 137–153; 2008, 180–216.
3.  Exactly, this relationship between possibility and the lack of development 
offers the basis for future application with a reference to sport. In 1975, Mitchell 
writes “that sport is an art-form experience that follows the form which Dewey con-
tributes to all art” (28). Similar argumentation can be found in general in Feezell 
(2004, 37–42), more narrowly interpreted in Martin (2007) for running, in Lally 
with respect to the process of self-cultivation of endurance athletes (2013, 189–196), 
or in Takahashi with a sport-pedagogical intention “to re-evaluate the concept of 
experience and education presented by J. Dewey in order to investigate the educa-
tional values which subsist in the sport experience itself ” (2013, 85). Kupfer (1985, 
111–140) shares Dewey’s view in particular; Welsch (2005, 148–150) also advocates 
Dewey’s position of focusing more on modern sport as a topic of aesthetics: as mod-
ern or postmodern art in everyday life and for everyone. Shields raises the useful 
transfer effect that sport experience has on university experiences (2010, 92).
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